Obama’s Handled Egypt Well

January 30th, 2011

Marc Lynch thinks Obama has handled the evolving situation in Egypt fairly well:

I completely understand why activists and those who desperately want the protestors to succeed would be frustrated — anything short of Obama gripping the podium and shouting “Down With Mubarak!” probably would have disappointed them. But that wasn’t going to happen, and shouldn’t have. If Obama had abandoned a major ally of the United States such as Hosni Mubarak without even making a phone call, it would have been irresponsible and would have sent a very dangerous message to every other U.S. ally. That doesn’t mean, as some would have it, that Obama has to stick with Mubarak over the long term — or even the weekend — but he simply had to make a show of trying to give a long-term ally one last chance to change.

I think he’s right in that regard. The U.S. had little choice but to, at the minimum, not undermine Mubarak in the beginning of what is increasingly looking like outright revolt by calling for him to step down. Mubarak is certainly a dictator, who’s refused to eliminate emergency powers for decades and to allow for democratic rule, but he’s also been a force for stability and moderation in the region. While it is debatable whether the U.S. should have put more pressure on him before to move toward democracy, I don’t think it’s up for discussion whether working with him, and pushing him to implement democracy, was the right strategy. It was, and immediately abandoning him at the first sight of opposition in the streets isn’t a good message to send to other allies.

The Obama administration has attempted to walk a rhetorical tight rope; they haven’t called for Mubarak to step aside, but they have said he must implement real political and economic reforms that give Egyptians liberty. They have tried to give Mubarak a chance to implement reforms before losing their support, and I think that was the right decision to make. One more reason this was the right choice to make before Saturday was that it gave the U.S. flexibility—while on the one hand they could say they were supporting the opposition movement’s desire for freedom if Mubarak were to fall, they also didn’t destroy their relationship with him if he didn’t. That’s a smart position to take in a very fluid situation.