TightWind is written by Kyle Baxter. Stay Hungry. Stay Foolish.

Robert Kagan thinks the Obama administration is operating under a new foreign policy paradigm, where the U.S.’s role is neutral arbiter:

Obama and his foreign policy team have apparently rejected two of the main pillars of this post–World War II strategy. Instead of attempting to perpetuate American primacy, they are seeking to manage what they regard as America’s unavoidable decline relative to other great powers. They see themselves as the architects of the “post-American” world. Although they will not say so publicly, in private they are fairly open about their policy of managed decline. In dealings with China, especially, administration officials believe they are playing from a hopelessly weak hand. Instead of trying to reverse the decline of American power, however, they are reorienting American foreign policy to adjust to it.

The Obama administration’s core assumption, oft-repeated by the president and his advisers, is that the great powers today share common interests. Relations among them need “no longer be seen as a zero sum game,” Obama has argued. The Obama Doctrine is about “win-win” and “getting to ‘yes.’” The new “mission” of the United States, according to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, is to be the great convener of nations, gathering the powers to further common interests and seek common solutions to the world’s problems. It is on this basis that the administration has sought to “reset” relations with Russia, embark on a new policy of “strategic reassurance” with China, and in general seek what Clinton has called a “new era of engagement based on common interests, shared values, and mutual respect.”

Whereas before the U.S. supported its allies in an attempt to create a bloc of free nations (politically and economically), this treats all nations equally to try to harmonize everyone’s interests toward common interests.

As Kagan points out, this policy is, the administration’s protests notwithstanding, zero-sum. Respecting Russia’s desires to control its traditional sphere of influence is inherently to the detriment of emerging eastern european democracies and central asian nations. Choosing to respect China’s autocratic political system is also choosing to let China’s minorities and political dissidents suffer.1

Kagan’s thesis accords with the administration’s actions. One of their first acts was to minimize our relationship with the British, dismissing the notion that we have a special relationship. After a particularly cold greeting for Prime Minister Brown’s visit to the U.S., one State Department official involved in its planning said

There’s nothing special about Britain. You’re just the same as the other 190 countries in the world. You shouldn’t expect special treatment.

When I read this in March, I was astounded. Britain is, no question, our closest ally in the world, both because of our common history and because of each side’s willingness to do whatever it takes to help the other partner. Whereas we have many friends in the world, Britain is a sister nation. So I read this comment, and the poorly-constructed diplomatic event that it resulted from, as incompetence — an administration that didn’t know how to treat our allies. (Which was infuriating all the more because of Obama’s promises to rebuild our alliances during is campaign.)

This event, so bewildering when it happened, fits neatly in Kagan’s theory: the Obama administration didn’t mistreat the British because they don’t know how to handle diplomacy, but rather because they wanted to send a message that our “old” allies are not of any more importance than any other country.

This is also apparent with Iran. During the opposition’s protests in Iran during the summer, Obama more or less refused to get involved. At the time I applauded this move, because I thought Obama’s goal was to not give the state any evidence to its claim of the opposition movement being foreign-controlled. But it’s become apparent since that this wasn’t the only, or perhaps even primary, motivation. Instead, it seems that Obama was (and is) afraid that political upheaval in Iran would threaten his negotiations with the regime over Iraq and their nuclear weapons. In other words, they chose an authoritarian regime they can negotiate with over political uncertainty and the possibility for a democratic and free Iran.

While they have courted the Russians and the Ahmadinejad regime in Iran, and laid down to Chinese demands during Obama’s visit to the nation, they have pushed down on our own allies. This is a worrying strategy — we are now placing autocratic, abusive regimes on the same level as democratic governments. I don’t think promoting democracy was merely a cold war strategy to defeat the Soviet Union. Promoting democracy — that is, promoting the rule of law, and respect for individual rights — is a responsibility of ours as a free nation. Not to enforce our will, but to encourage other states to protect their people’s rights and take every opportunity to bring others into liberty. This new policy is ambivalent to that.

1. Respecting China’s political system should be distinguished from a policy of putting up with it in hopes that engaging with the regime will cause it to shift toward rule of law and protection for individual rights. The former doesn’t seek to change the system, while the latter does. [↩]